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CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW. By Robert F. Nagel. University of California
Press. 1989. Pp. 232.
REVIEWED BY LEONARD P. STRICKMAN*
As is often the case when a new book crosses my desk, I read
the dust jacket of Robert F. Nagel's book, Constitutional Cultures,
which attempts to set out the thesis for his particular endorsement of
judicial self-restraint by the United States Supreme Court. In his
summarized views on the evils of judicial activism the dust jacket
asserts "constant application of the artificial logic of legal doctrine
diminishes public support for basic values. . . . [l]n their ambitious
efforts to give immediate effect to the Constitution, courts gradually
undermine the very system they seek to protect." Later, the same
summary concludes, "If constitutional law is to be wise and useful
... we must resort to it less often."
I could not help thinking, as I turned to the Table of Contents,
"What about Brown v. Board of Education?" I was therefore delighted to find that Chapter I was titled ''What About Brown?'' and
realized that Nagel, whose scholarship I have always found provocative, had hooked me.
What about Brown? Despite its tortured doctrinal analyses and
problematic historical supports, there would appear to be a wide
consensus amongst constitutional scholars and political scientists that
this exercise of judicial activism, which was without precedent for its
sweeping social consequences, was an appropriate exercise of judicial
authority in the vestments of constitutional interpretation. Nagel does
not disagree with this consensus but is compelled to justify its apparent
inconsistency with his primary thesis:
Our political life had made available to the Justices a body of
common experience about both segregation and integration.
In the context of this experience, racial exclusion unmistakably
involved acute insult and profound political injustice; in light
of this experience, nondiscriminatory attendance policies stood,
not as imaginable, but as familiar alternatives. Everyday perceptions grounded Brown in a morality that was both powerful
and widely understandable. 1
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This passage reflects an important part of the Nagel thesis.
Constitutional meaning is to be derived more from culture-"common
experience" and wide understanding-than from interpretation, the
often anti-cultural device of lawyers. Further, because the constitutional cultures-widely shared assumptions about both governmental
structures and public moral values-are more accurately identified by
the political process than the judiciary, judicial intervention should
occur only where there has been a departure from the clear prescriptions of the Constitution, or where, as in Brown, an aberrant regional
political structure has acted in contradiction of national cultural
norms. Negative consequences which flow from a more active judicial
role are that:
1. opportunities for the evolutionary development of constitutional cultures are cut off by judicial pronouncements; and
2. overall respect for the law as an instrument of justice is
reduced.
Nagel amplifies his basic thesis by examining the judicial role in
three specific areas of constitutional adjudication: free speech, federalism and equal protection. He believes there is a constitutional
culture which constrains the suppression of that free speech which is
of political consequence, and that judicial interventions tend either to
undermine that culture (for example, when reviewing the regulation
of corporate political contributions, commercial advertising or nude
dancing) by embracing within the concept activity not worthy of
similar respect, or to cause suppression of political speech by carefully
drawing lines about that which is protected, thus encouraging regulation or prohibition of that which is outside the line.
His stated assumption that ''politicians . . . understand . . . the
needs and values of a system of free expression ... on which they
depend" 2 would appear naive, given that it is those who have achieved
public office who make governmental decisions, and whose maintenance of power may be threatened by free expression. Moreover, in
light of technological advances which permit government to more
readily than ever suppress civil liberties, openly or surreptitiously,
there is an argument that the need for judicial protection of first
amendment values has actually increased in the second half of the
twentieth century.
I surely accept Nagel's view that there is a social and political
culture embracing free expression which is vital to the viability of the
2. Id. at 55.
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first amendment, but I believe he dismisses too summarily the role
that judicial interpretation has played in reinforcing that culture. It
may be that nude dancing and commercial advertising are not at the
core of the culture, but their protection by the Supreme Court provides
an important buffer against the erosion of liberties more central to
the maintenance of a democratic society. In other words, if we have
our interpretive battles about nude dancing, we are less likely to have
to confront issues of seditious libel. Rather than undermining the core
values of the first amendment, judicial activism tends to reinforce
them. While I cannot prove this proposition empirically, the health
of those core values after a half century of judicial activism at the
periphery would seem to refute Nagel's concerns.
When one is arguing for judicial restraint as a matter of process,
every bad judicial decision may be used as support for the general
proposition. I agree with Nagel, for example, that Board of Education
v. Pico, 3 a Supreme Court case limiting the right of a local school
board to decide which books should be purchased by a school library,
was wrongly decided. Uniformly bad decisions might prove that courts
should not make decisions, but it is simply fallacious to argue a
process result by substantive illustration. 4
Like most judicial restraint advocates of this era, Nagel makes
an exception for judicial intervention on behalf of states' rights,
particularly in defending the result in National League of Cities v.
Usery. 5 Apparently theories of federalism provide justifiable occasions
for judicial activism because they are based on historical understanding of the intent of the framers, rather than on more problematic and
subjective judicial interpretation. Nagel's suggestion that the states
are not capable of protecting their presumed sovereignty from federal
overreaching through the political process is probably correct; but his
companion view that individual rights are likely to be protected by
that same process is difficult to accept. In my view, National League
of Cities was decided incorrectly, not because the Court should have
foresworn decision-making on process grounds, but because principles
of Constitutional federalism, as developed through the process of
judicial interpretation, supported the validity of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to state and local governments. The framers
might well have been shocked by such a result; but it is through the
3. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
4. Nagel cites school desegregation decrees to argue activist courts are likely
to abuse the first amendment in the course of protecting more subjective constitutional
values. See NAGEL supra note 1, at 55, n.152.
5. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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process of interpretation and incremental change that our Constitution
has had the capacity to respond to both technological progress (particularly in transportation and communication) and social need. Judicial interpretation, rather than defeating our Constitutional culture,
has contributed to it. Nagel writes:
To see the purposes of judicial review almost entirely in terms
of securing individual rights is to invert the priorities of the
framers and ultimately to trivialize the Constitution. The
framers' political theory was immediately concerned with organization, not individuals. Their most important contributions had to do with principles of power allocation .... Even
the danger of local majoritarian excess-so frequently cited
today as a justification for vigorous protection of individual
rights-cannot reconcile the modern emphasis on rights with
the priorities of the framers. 6
The Bill of Rights was essential to the adoption of the Constitution, notwithstanding its subordinate role in the eyes of the original
framers, and the fourteenth amendment is entitled to no less recognition than Article I because of its late adoption. Indeed, the fourteenth amendment became a part of the Constitution after the full
acceptance of the principles of judicial review, and was in large part
a response to the exercise of constitutional interpretation by the
Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 1
Nagel's discussion and critique of the Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence provides one of the most persuasive chapters
in the book. His analysis of the cases in which the Court has applied
the "mere rationality" test to strike down legislative classifications,
demonstrates convincingly the absence of a conceptually sound theoretical basis for the Court's development of the law. Assuming,
however, that the intent of the framers of the equal protection clause
identified by the Slaughterhouse cases as exclusively concerned with
racial discrimination was not the final word on the subject, the Court's
troubled and unconvincing search for a sound analytical framework
in which to consider equal protection claims is not a sufficient reason
for denying the ultimate value of the process of interpretation.
Nagel questions effectively the employment of rationalism in
constitutional judicial review. "Important social decisions," he states,
"cannot be limited to those areas for which information is readily
6. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 64-65.
7. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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available and susceptible to conclusive analysis. " 8 Indeed he concludes:
Legislative "irrationality," ... provides real advantages to a
democratic system. If values need not be formally articulated
and consistently pursued, legislators can serve many interests
at once. 9
This is persuasive, except in those areas where the nature of the
classification demands that the values being furthered be examined
with closer scrutiny, as the Court does when it uses an elevated
standard of review. Rationalism is a device which may well be too
easily manipulated by reviewing courts when the presumption should
favor the political process, for example in the "mere rationality" test.
However, rationalism does provide useful interpretive tools appropriate for judicial application where the presumption of deference is
overridden, such as when the legislature employs a suspect classification.
In his final chapter, Nagel considers the characteristics of judicial
interpretation of the Constitution embraced by notions of standards
of review-as he characterizes them, the formulaic Constitution. His
primary criticism of the formulaic model is that "[i]t achieves organizational control and intellectual respectability, to the extent that it
does so, by excluding the general public from the Court's audience
and impoverishing the Court's thought." 10
Nagel suggests that the Court's formulaic style is addressed to its
clerks, lower courts and academics, 11 and by excluding the public,
defeats the development of valuable constitutional cultures. Notwithstanding their doctrinal shortcomings, he exalts the opinions of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland12 and Chief Justice Warren
in Brown v. Board of Education 13 for their inspirational, and nonformulaic, rhetoric. I am not sure that the language of judicial
opinions was incorporated into a societal culture in either of these
cases, but I do believe that Nagel has given too short shrift to the
importance of the Court's speaking to the players in the constitutional
scheme-lower courts, legislatures, government officials and the bar
which must advise its clients with respect to constitutional questions.
8. NAGEL, supra note l, at 114.
9. Id. at 119.
IO. Id. at 131.
11. See id. at 129.
12. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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While the formulaic approach has surely not created certainty regarding the resolution of hard constitutional issues, it has provided
predictability and routineness in a great portion of the functioning of
governmental institutions. To forego the effort to achieve analytical
models which will provide predictability and guidance for actors in
the constitutional system will, in my opinion, impair the ultimate
viability of the system.
In any event, Robert Nagel has written a stimulating book, one
worthy of serious attention by constitutional scholars. His critique of
the Supreme Court is novel and challenging, although I would conclude that his attack on the process of judicial interpretation is, in
the final analysis, unpersuasive.

